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et al.: Recent Cases

Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SELF INCRIMINATION AND THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT
Quinn v. United States"
Emspak v. United States'
Bart v. United States3
In the cases under discussion, the three defendants were each being cited
for criminal contempt of Congress, allegedly having refused to answer pertinent
and proper questions put to them by a subcommittee of the Committee on
Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives. As these cases all
present similar and related problems which have become more pressing in recent
years, they will be discussed together.
In the Quinn case, the defendant appeared before a subcommittee of the
Committee on Un-American Activities on August 10, 1949, pursuant to subpoena.
He was at the time a member and field representative of the United Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers of America. His appearance was prompted by the
announced purpose of the investigations, to determine the need and "the advisability of tightening present security requirements in industrial plants working
on certain government contracts."'
Quinn appeared, without counsel, and was asked whether he had ever been
a member of the Communist Party, but declined to answer on the grounds that
had been adopted by another witness the previous day-"the first and fifth
Amendments" as well as "the First Amendment to the Constitution, supplemented
by the Fifth Amendment."'
On November 20, 1950, Quinn was indicted under a provision of the United
States Code for failure to answer questions.' This occurred just two months

1. 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
2. 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
3. 849 U.S. 219 (1955).
4. Hearings before House Committee on Un-American Activities Regarding
Communist Infiltration of Labor Unions, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 541-542.
5. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
6. 52 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952) reads: "Every person who
having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress
to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before
either House, or any joint committee established under a joint or concurrent
resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committtee of either House of
Congress willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer
any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100
and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than
twelve months."

(66)
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after the conviction of eleven principal leaders in the Communist Party under
the Smith Act, on the grounds of conspiring to teach and advocate the violent
overthrow of the United States government. It is worthy of note here that,
without the Smith Act provision for the punishment of such leaders, Section
192 of the United States Code would be without much effect on witnesses.
The district court held that a witness may not rely upon the position of
other witnesses, rejecting Quinn's defense based on the Fifth Amendment,' and
sentenced him to six months in jail and a $500 fine.
Upon appeal to the court of appeals on the question of whether the grounds
relied upon by defendant were sufficient to invoke immunity in fear of selfincrimination, the conviction was reversed. Upon this question the court of
appeals was uncertain, and ordered a new trial to determine the question. The
court of appeals also directed the district court to determine whether Quinn was
aware of the intention of the questioner that he answer the questions despite
the objections he had to them. They further rejected Quinn's contention that a
witness could not be convicted under Section 192 for refusal to answer unless
expressly so directed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari from this decision of the court of
appeals.
In the Emspak case, the defendant was brought before the same subcommittee for questioning concerning Communist affiliation and/or associations
of certain members of the union, and the advisability of tightening present
security requirements in industrial plants working on government contracts. The
defendant was the then General Secretary-Treasurer of the United Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers of America, and Editor of the United Electrical
News, the official publication of the union. Emspak was asked some sixty-eight
questions concerning his associations and affiliations. His refusal to answer was
based on "primarily the First Amendment, supplemented by the Fifth."'
The district court held that defendant's references to "primarily the First
Amendment, supplemented by the Fifth"' were insufficient to invoke the Fifth
Amendment protection on grounds of self-incrimination, and sentenced him to
six months and a fine of $500. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, en bane, with three dissenting
judges. The Supreme Court granted certiorari from this decision of the court
of appeals.

7. U.S. CoNsT. Amend V. The pertinent part of this amendment reads:
.. . nor shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself . . ."
8. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
9. Id.
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The Bart case'* was one involving the same question of the defendant's
failure to answer questions posed by a subcommittee of the committee on UnAmerican Activities of the House of Representatives. The defendant, appearing
in response to subpoena, was general manager of the Freedom of Press Co., Inc.,
which publishes the Daily Worker, and general manager of the Daily Worker.
The defendant was questioned concerning his background, activities, and certain
alleged associations. The particular question which Bart refused to answer concerned the name of his father upon coming to this country, and the defendant's
name upon his gaining citizenship-all matters of record. He based his refusals
on pertinency (family background) and the privilege against self-incrimination.
The trial court rejected the defendant's objections as without merit, and
before the court of appeals, the defendant abandoned his reliance on the question
of pertinency in his defense. To this, the court of appeals declared that this
abandonment removed defendant's objections, and that it then became a question
of "naked refusals to answer.""
The supreme court granted certiorari from this holding of the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia.
Due to the similarity of issues and charges, the Quinn and Emspak cases
were argued together, while the Bart case, a companion case to the others, was
argued separately. However, the three opinions often cited each other, indicating
the close association of questions and facts in the courts' consideration of the
cases.
The cases presented three basic issues for their proper determination. They
were:
(1) What is required of a witness successfully to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when answering questions before investigating committees, and further, how may this privilege be waived?
(2) To what extent must the committee go in ruling on the objections of
witnesses, so that, if they persist in their objection and refusal to answer, the
witness will be subjected to criminal liability for contempt of Congress?
(3) To what type question may the witness be permitted successfully to
invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and under
what circumstances may he do so?
The Court carefully analyzed these questions, with Mr. Chief Justice Warren
giving the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Reed and Mr. Justice Harlan dissenting
vigorously.

10. Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955).
11. Id.
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I.
The court, in each of the three cases presented, reversed the lower court's
convictions, and directed that a judgment of acquittal be entered.
In so doing, the court justified and recognized the power of Congress to
hold such investigations and examine witnesses [citing several cases]. The
court said :"2

"There can be no doubt as to the power of Congress, by itself or
through its committees, to investigate matters and conditions relating to
contemplated legislation."
Continuing:13
"But the power to investigate . . . is also subject to recognized

limitations."
It is these limitations with which we are concerned in answering the first
proposition offered. The court quoted with approval the statement in Twining v.
New Jersey " pertaining to the use of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.
"The privilege . . . was generally regarded then [relating to Bill
of Rights], as now, as a privilege of great value, a protection to the
innocent,. though a shelter to the guilty, and a safe guard against
heedless, unfounded or tyrannical prosecutions."
Thus the court laid the foundation for the manner of interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment, as was established in one of the land mark cases in this
regard,. in determining that "the self-incrimination clause must be accorded
liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure." (emphasis
added).
The court reviewed cases in this regard that plainly indicate that no special
statement or combination of words is essential to invoke the Fifth Amendment.
Here the court referred to Snith v. United States" in this respect. The court
went on to say that all that is necessary is for the witness to make his objection to questions so that "a committee may reasonably be expected to understand [it] as an attempt to invoke the privilege." 7 The court here did not limit
this to the committee, but also extended this meaning to the courts.
The court emphasized that it was conceded that the defendants (Quinn and
Emspak) intended to invoke the privilege, and that the government's argument

12. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160 (1955).
13. Id.
14. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908).
15. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
16. Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 at pp. 142, 151 (1949). In this case
the witness' statement "I want to claim privilege as to anything that I say,"
prompted the court to say that this was a "definite claim of general privilege
against self-incrimination."
17. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
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that the objection was made "to obtain the benefit of the privilege without incurring the popular opprobrium which often attaches to its exercise" was unsound, giving three reasons for so holding.18
(a) The court stated that when an objection was clear enough to indicate
the defendant's probable intent, it cannot properly be ignored merely because
it was not phrased in a particular or specified manner.
(b) If the contention be true, that there is a handicap which may be imposed
upon a witness who invokes the privilege, then the committee should be all the
more ready to recognize such.
(c) The court pointed out that a committee is not obligated to make an
immediate ruling on the objection."
In the opinion in the Quinn case the court pointed out that the reliance upon
two constitutional grounds for privilege does not give one precedence over the
other. Even though one of the grounds be untenable, the witness need not choose
between the two at his peril, and lose both for that reason.
In application of the standards, indefinite as they necessarily must be, the
present cases present an interesting example of a sufficiently declared reliance
on the self-incrimination clause. In response to the question as to whether he
had ever been a member of the Communist Party, Quinn stated: 20
"... I should like to say that I support the position taken by
Brother Fitzpatrick yesterday."

18. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
19. This point involves a further problem that will be considered later. Regarding this see p. 73.
20. The witness referred to stated that he relied on the "First Amendment
supplemented by the Fifth." A more complete text of the exchange between
witness and interrogator following should be helpful in this respect. Hearings
before House Committee on Un-American Activities Regarding Communist Infiltration of Labor Unions, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 634-635:
"Mr. Quinn. I would like to make a statement along the lines that Mr.
Fitzpatrick made yesterday in regard to a question of that nature. I feel that
the political beliefs, opinions, and associations of the American people can be
held secret if they so desire
"MAr.' Wood. Did you hear his statement yesterday?
"Mr. Quinn. Yes, I did.
"Mr. Wood. Do you support it in its entirety?
"Mr. Quinn. In its entirety.
"Mr. Wood. Is there anything else you want to add to it?
"Mr. Quinn. No; I don't.
"Mr. Wood. Will you accept it as the expression of your views, then?
"Mr. Quinn. You may. I may add I feel I have no other choice in this matter, because the defense of the Constitution I hold sacred. I don't feel I am
hiding behind the Constitution, but in this case I am standing before it, defending it, as small as I am.
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And in the Emspak case, the witness, in response to questions concerning
certain associations and affiliations, stated:21
"Because of the hysteria, I think it is my duty to endeavor to protect the rights guaranteed under the Constitution, primarily the First
Amendment, supplemented by the Fifth. This committee will corrupt
those rights."
In both of these situations the court held that there was a sufficient indication of intent for the committee reasonably to be aware of the witness' reliance
on the self-incrimination clause. Thus, we are able to get some indication of the
manner in which the court will enforce and apply this standard, if it can be regarded as such.
The problem of waiver of privilege and immunity based on rights protected
by our Constitution presents a further question and gives an indication of the
extent to which the court will go to protect the rights guaranteed in the Constitution, and particularly in the Fifth Amendment.
This question was one of primary concern in the Bart case. There, when
the defendant abandoned his objection to questions on the grounds of pertinence,
the court of appeals sustained a conviction for contempt, saying that this abandonment removed the defendant's objections, and that it was then merely an absolute refusal to answer. The supreme court pointed out that a rule could never
be adopted that would permit an abandonment to have an effect such as this.
In the Emspa case, the government urged waiver on the basis of defendant's
answer:2

,.. .I don't think this committee has a right to pry into my associations. That is my own position."
In answer to this argument the court referred to the Smith case,"- noting
that they considered it controlling. Furthermore, the court referred to a decision
in which they set out the principle that courts must "indulge every reasonable
2
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights."Y'

"Mr. Wood. You have stated your position. Having enunciated your sentiments and your position, will you now answer the question whether you are now
or ever have been a member of the Communist Party, or do you decline to
answer?
"Mr. Quinn. I decline to discuss with the committee questions of that nature."
21. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 193 (1953).
22. Id., at p. 196.
23. Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, at p. 150 (1949): "Although the
privilege against self-incrimination must be claimed, when claimed it is guaranteed by the Constitution ... Waiver of constitutional rights ..

.

is not

lightly to be inferred. A witness cannot properly be held after claim to have
waived his privilege . . . upon vague and uncertain evidence."

24.

Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
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But in the Quinn case, the court pointed out that if the witness "unequivocally and intelligently""5 waives any objection based on the self-incrimination
clause he cannot later complain that he has been denied any constitutional right.
Such a policy as this seems highly desirable. This is particularly true in
that if the courts be quick to pronounce waiver, witnesses will be more hesitant
and reluctant to answer questions than otherwise they might. Absent their fear
of unintentionally waiving the privilege against self-incrimination this danger
would not likely be prevalent. Furthermore, when thought is given to the individual liberties and rights guaranteed by the Constitution, this protection against
self-incrimination is commonly placed in a somewhat different category from
such fundamental rights as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of
religion, and right of assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment, or the fundamentals of a fair trial, all of which, unlike the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, are construed as being embraced within the protection of the
due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to the states.
Yet in many respects it may be regarded as one of the most important protections
afforded to the people in the federal courts, and nearly all state constitutions
also contain a similar guarantee. Only under a system of government where
this privilege is denied is its full significance appreciated. It is the feeling of the
present writer that it should be regarded, as it is by many, as one of our most
cherished protections against tyrannical judicial enforcement. It is not to be
given up lightly by the mere whim of an investigating committee or judge. It
is to be protected with all the force that our courts provide.
II.
In allowing any conviction for contempt of Congress, under Section 192, the
court emphasizes that there must be a criminal intent-a deliberate, intentional
refusal to answer. This had previously been recognized in the case of Sinclair V.
0
United States."
In finding this element we are faced with another question,
earlier expounded, as to what extent the committee (or the courts) must go in
ruling on the objections of witnesses. This necessarily must be determined in
order to subject witnesses to contempt citations for persisting with objections
that have been denied. The rule relating to this subject was established in United
States v. Kamp, this court citing such case with approval, where it said:""
'. . . anything short of a clear cut default on the part of the witness
will not sustain a conviction for contempt of Congress . . ."
Thus it appears that the committee must clearly advise the witness that his
answer is demanded, his objections notwithstanding. And, without this, there

25. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
26. 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929).
27. United States v. Kamp, 102 F. Supp. 757, 759 (D.C. Dist. Col. 1952).
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can be no conviction for his refusal to answer, whether his objection be wellfounded or not. This does not mean, as the court pointed out, that any definite
words or phrases need be adopted. This was likewise true in the previous section
on the witnesses invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege.
And in the Emspak case, the court said that there need be presented to defendant a clear cut choice between compliance and non-compliance-between answering the question, or being cited for criminal contempt. Without this, the court
said that there could not be present the necessary element of willfulness.
Also, in the Bart case, the court said that the witness is entitled to a clearcut ruling at that time, even though the claim upon which the objection is based
be invalid or later abandoned.
It appears that the committee cannot leave the witness to guess or speculate
as to whether a further insistence upon the objection would subject him to criminal liability. Such a decision as this seems reasonable, as the witness cannot be
expected to know without direct denial of this objection that it has been so denied.
As to the application of this ruling of the court, it appears that some difficulty
may be found in deciding each case as to whether or not the witness has been
sufficiently informed of his rights. That such difficulty would arise seems readily
understandable on such an indefinite question as this, lacking anything concrete
on which to base judgments.
In the Quinn case, the government relied upon an exchange where, after the
witness had expressed himself concerning the position he was taking in regard
to the constitutional rights guaranteed him, the witness was further asked:2
"You have stated your position. Having enunciated your sentiments
and your position, will you now answer the question whether you are now
or ever have been a member of the Communist Party, or do you decline
to answer."
The witness declined, and then the interrogator switched the line of questioning. Primarily on this exchange, the court overruled the government's contention that the witness was sufficiently informed of the committee's desire for
him to answer the question notwithstanding his objections.
In the Emspak case, the greatest extent to which the questioner went in overruling the objection of witness was during a long exchange between Mr. Moulder, subcommittee member, and the defendant witness. The witness denounced
the committee's purposes, activities, and rights so to question. Finally, the witness
was asked: 2

28.
29.

Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
Emspak v. United States, S49 U.S. 190, 217 (1955).
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"Are you or are you not acquainted with Joseph Persily?"
"I answered the question." (here referring to his statements mentioned above.)
"Your replies are a refusal to comply with the request to answer it?"
"I have answered it to the best of my ability under the circumstances."
In the Bart case, the witness, while being questioned concerning the witness'
name upon becoming a citizen, was asked:"
"I understand you refuse to answer the chairman's question?"
"My answer is that I have answered what my name is hee . .

"And then, I suppose you know that under the law a question
innocent on its face can't be arbitrarily ignored. You can't refuse to
answer such a question without running the risk of consequences."
A committee member at this point suggested to the chairman that the witness
be advised of possible contempt charges. But this was not done because the witness
had his own competent counsel.
In each of these three cases, the court, in applying the law, held that the committee must present the witness with a clear-cut choice, making it clear that he
must answer or subject himself to contempt citation. They held that this had not
been done-that at no time had the committee unequivocally indicated their demand
for an answer and their denial of the objection.
Thus the second part of our issues-the duty of the committee in ruling on
objections-has been answered and the difficulty of applying any rule or standard
pertaining to the question at hand is evident.
III.
The remaining question is obviously the essential one in the entire determination of these cases, and others with similar questions and problems. It is: to
what type question(s) may the witness be permitted successfully to invoke the
Fifth Amendment on which the privilege is based. It says:"
"... nor shall any person .
be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself."
These words are very definite in their nature and call for a strict standard
in their observance and proper enforcement.
30.
31.

Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955).
U.S. CONST. Amend. V.
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In the cases at bar, there are questions dealing with Communist activity in
related phases--the defendants' membership in the Communist Party, their associations, and their activities in relation thereto. In regard to the background of
the questioning, with the expressed purpose of attempting to go further into
Communist activity, particularly in labor unions, so as to propose remedial legislation, it would seem, and the court so held, that questions directly concerning
these Communist activities are privileged.
The self-incrimination clause does not require that the answer would be
sufficient to ground a conviction, per se, but need only tend to incriminate. That
evidence which at first might only tend to incriminate a witness might later provide a link in evidence sufficient to convict a witness of a criminal charge would
seem evident. This might be carried even further to include evidence apparently
innocent, but in fact quite damaging. It is to be determined by the implication
of the question, which if answered might be incriminating. This was established
by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in the United States v. Burr case:"
"Many links frequently compose that chain of testimony which is
necessary to convict any individual of a crime. It appears . . . that no
witness is compellable to furnish any one of them against himself."
It is also worthy of note that the Communist question specifically was decided
in PatriciaBlau v. United States" as being within the privilege. The question
was presented after the defendant there refused to answer questions of her
alleged membership in the Communist Party.
Another point pertinent to this consideration brought out by the court in
these cases was that while the witness need not answer questions that even tend
to incriminate him, likewise he is privileged not to give an explanation as to why
he so refuses. This could be particularly important in regard to an apparently
innocuous question which the witness might feel would lead to incriminating evidence. To force an explanation would be to destroy the very effect of the privilege, as his explanation must invariably be revealing in itself." Such are the
problems that face the courts in this respect.
As was mentioned previously, the dissenting opinions in these cases are
worthy of note, there being four separate opinions written, each relating in large
part to all three of the cases under consideration.
In the opinion by Mr. Justice Reed-to the Quinn and Enspak cases, he does
not appear to disagree with the standards set up by the court in determining
the questions put forth, but rather in the application of these standards to the

32. 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 40, No. 14692e (C.C. Va. 1807).
33. 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950).
24. An interesting discussion on this and related problems presented may
be found in GRiswOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY (Harvard News Service,
1955).
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instant cases. His concern is with the court deciding as a matter of law that
these witnesses had successfully invoked the privilege against self-incrimination,
contending it to be a question of fact for the jury. He contends that the question is more properly answered by the sub-committee as to whether a witness was
attempting to use the Fifth Amendment as a protective shield, that body being
aware of the right to rely upon the privilege.
Mr. Justice Reed also criticized the court for relying on what the intention
of the party was-and not what he actually and in fact did. The dissenting
opinion referred to the witness' efforts to delay and hinder the investigation, and
the writer did not feel that to uphold such action was adding to the protection
of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. This seems to be the main
premise upon which the dissent was based.
As to the direction to answer by the committee, again Mr. Justice Reed
agreed as to what is required of the committee, but dissented on application. He
said that it was not the bad faith, but rather the intentional and deliberate
refusal to answer when so directed, if the witness had been so directed, that constituted contempt.
As to Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in the Enspak case, his opinion was
largely based on the incriminating nature of the questions. He contended that
some were not incriminating. But since the penalty imposed for all was less than
the maximum for conviction on any one count then the sentence should be affirmed.
He contended that the danger of incrimination must be "real and appreciable" and not "of an imaginary and unsubstantial character.""' In support of
this doctrine of real versus imaginary danger, many cases were cited."
Mr. Justice Harlan contended that Emspak's refusal to answer questions
concerning his acquaintances within the union was not justifiable. The defendant held an admitted position therein-general secretary-treasurer-that would
require and explain his acquaintances with many persons, both within the union,
and without its organization. This contention of Mr. Justice Harlan seems quite
feasible and well reasoned, and is certainly worthy of consideration in this case.
Also, certainly the witness's desire to avoid being branded a stool pigeon
should not be a sufficient and justifiable reason, as Mr. Justice Harlan urged.
Mr. Justice Harlan further dissented as to what was necessary for the subcommittee to do to require an answer. This disagreement was largely based upon
the standard established by the majority, he contending that when a witness
objects and refuses to answer, that the refusal is not any the less deliberate or

35. Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
36. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 159 (1950); Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
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intentional. This would be true regardless of later committee action, an important aspect of the majority's standard.
Further, there was questioned the application of even the standard adopted, it
appearing too liberal to the writer of the dissent-Mr. Justice Harlan. He seemed
to urge a rule such as applied in United States v. Weisman, " indicating it to have
been a more accepted rule of application. That was to take from the witness
the right to be the sole judge of the questions, and the possibility of -their revealing incriminating evidence. He indicated that he thought the witness should be
required to present some indication of the grounds that the question could lead
to incriminating evidence, and that there should be some substance to the objection.
Again in the Bart case, Mr. Justice Reed, joined by Mr. Justice Minton
dissented from point number two of the issues presented-that of the standards
of action to be taken by the sub-committee and the application thereof. The objection here is based once again on the application of their standard-that the
witness was aware, or should reasonably have been, of the committee's insistence
on an answer.
This point is further emphasized in another opinion written by Mr. Justice
Harlan, it being pointed out that four of the five counts on which the witness was
convicted were merely the same question worded differently. This should have
been sufficient evidence to the defendant witness that an answer was demanded.
Thus, these standards for application as established by the majority opinion
will find difficult and inconsistent application. This is evidenced by these three
dissents. All of these dissents except one, partially, disagreed not with the standard, but with its application.
In reviewing these standards established and further explained by these
opinions, we see:
(1) Reliance on the privilege of self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution is to be recognized when it appears
that the witness so desires, it not being neccessary that any set terminology be
used to gain the privilege. Furthermore, it should be guarded carefully, and one
is not to be deprived of the privilege though his means to that end be somewhat
vague. Waiver of this privilege should only be found by the courts when there
is clear and distinct evidence of it, and should not be taken lightly.
(2) The committee must make some clear indication to the witness and inform him that any objection and refusal to answer is not regarded as competent
and justifiable, and an answer is demanded. This is a prerequisite to a conviction
for criminal contempt of Congress.

37.

111 F.2d 260 (2nd Cir. 1940).
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(3) A question which may appear or tend to incriminate, whether of itself
it would so incriminate, is within the protected category. It is not necessary
that the witness state his fears in not answering. Even to those apparently
innocuous questions, objections are not to be denied without just consideration
and thought of all possible answers which might tend to incriminate the witness."
That these cases will be sharply criticized is almost certain. In any case with
vigorous, apparently sound dissenting opinions, criticism is to be expected. On a
controversial subject such as the one involved, it is even more certain that unfavorable comment will be voiced. The soundness of any criticism of the majority
opinion is not to be decided in this note. However, it would seem that in less
controversial circumstances, such standards as were established by this court in
these cases would undoubtedly be approved. Likewise, a similar application
might not cause question to arise as to the soundness of such a decision. But the
fact remains, that courts in the United States, in protecting individual liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution, are not applying different standards to similar
factual situations, appearing in different settings. This fact, and its desirability,
could not properly be questioned.
ELViN S. DOUGLAS, JR.

FEDERAL TAXATION-CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO REFUND
SUITS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
Bushmiaer v. United States'
Plaintiffs, co-executors of the estate of J.W. Myers, deceased, on October 1,
1954, received a deficiency notice to the effect that the estate owed income taxes

38. A case now pending before the supreme court may well be worthy of
note in regard to the problems presented in the present cases. That case is
Slochower v. City of New York, 119 N.E.2d 373, 121 N.E.2d 629 (1954).
Dr. Slochower was a teacher at Brooklyn College who was discharged for
failing to answer certain questions involving his Communist Party membership
during 1941-1942. His release was based on a New York Charter provision that
provides automatic dismissal for any person who fails to answer questions put
to them concerning their official conduct on grounds of self-incrimination. The
City of New York is attempting to uphold the constitutionality of the provision,
and its application to the present circumstances. It is further urging the supreme
court to adopt a precedent that failure to answer such questions on grounds
of self-incrimination can be given only two implications-guilt, or perjury.
If this view be adopted as is urged, that decision could then have very
drastic effect on the cases at bar. This would depend, of course, in part, on the
extent to which the court would go in applying such a doctrine if it is so adopted,
as would seem to be rather unlikely, in light of previous decisions. This opinion,
of course, is necessarily based on the cases now under consideration.
1.

131 F. Supp. 589 (W.D. Ark. 1955).
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for the years 1942 and 1943 totaling $91,415.65, with fraud penalties asserted
of $45,696.83. On December 16, 1954, the estate made payments of $2500.00 in
partial satisfaction of the assessed tax liability for each of the years 1942 and
1943. Then on December 20, 1954, the estate made claims for refund on Treasury
Form 843, for the $2500.00 that was paid for each year. The claims for refund
were disallowed and none of the taxes were refunded to the estate. Plaintiffs
then filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas, to recover the total $5000 that was paid in partial satisfaction of the
assessed tax liability.
The question arising in the case is whether a taxpayer, when faced with
a deficiency assessment, may make a token payment and then sue the United
States in a federal district court to recover the token payment and thereby
vitiate the entire assessment and tax. If he cannot do this, the taxpayer must
seek his remedy in the Tax Court or pay the entire tax and then file suit in
the federal district court to recover the amount paid.
Plaintiffs stated that since the estate was clearly not in a position to pay
the proposed tax liability, the personal representatives were constantly threatened
with a jeopardy assessment. This, the plaintiffs claimed, destroyed the usual
advantage in petitioning the Tax Court where, ordinarily, the filing of a petition
would hold in abeyance the assessment of the tax and the filing of the liens until
final decision of the court.' Also, the plaintiffs claimed that a hearing in the
Tax Court would not afford them a jury trial and another year and a half or
two years would pass before the docket would allow a hearing. The plaintiffscontended that it would be impossible to operate a fresh fruit and vegetable
business under the threat of a tax lien for such a long time and their only
alternative to selling the business in order to partially satisfy the tax was to,
pay as much as possible and then seek to recover in the federal district court.
The court held that either the plaintiff's remedy was in the Tax Court, or
that they must pay the entire tax prior to bringing suit for its recovery.
By not filing a petition with the Tax Court within 90 days after the mailing
of the notice of deficiency the plaintiffs lost their right to seek relief there, since
the Tax Court loses jurisdiction if the petition is not filed within 90 days.'
The case of Siiian Lamp Co. v. Manning,' held that the right of a taxpayer
to sue a collector of internal revenue was not based on statute but rather, on the

2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6213.
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6213; Gradsky v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 218 P.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1954).
4. 123 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1941).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/9

14

et al.: Recent Cases
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

common law action for money had and received.' The theory was that if a tax
is erroneous the collector is unjustly enriched even though the full amount claimed
to be due is not paid. The court said:
"The effect of section 3226 is merely to require a preliminary unsuccessful appeal to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as a condition precedent to the enforcement of the common law liability, (Sage
v. United States, 250 U.S. 33, 36, 37, 39 S.Ct. 415, 63 L.Ed. 828), to
eliminate the common law requirement that the payment sought to be
recovered back must have been made under protest or duress, and to
prescribe a period of limitations within which the suit must be brought.
It is true that the section has an additional purpose in the case of a
suit against the United States, but that purpose does not concern us
here."
Section 7422 of the 1954 Code, the successor to the provision mentioned in the
Sirian case, does not specifically state that the entire tax must be paid. So the
question remains whether the statute must be so interpreted so as to require
payment of the entire tax. The Sirian case held the entire tax did not have to
be paid.
The case of Hanchett v. Shaughnessy' held that a taxpayer who had made
only a part payment of a single and inseparable income tax deficiency assessment
to the Director of Internal Revenue could maintain an action in a district court
against the Director for the recovery of such payment. The Hanchett case is
also based on the theory that the taxpayer has a common law right of action
against the collector as an individual for money had and received.
The Supreme Court of the United States recognized the common law action
against the collector in the case of United States U. Nunnally Inv. Co.' The
Nunnally case held that an action by an individual against a collector as an
individual was not res judicata against the United States. The latter holding
is now covered by Section 7422(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which
provides that in cases of suits against collectors and other officers and employees
the United States is treated as if it had been a party. But the statute in no
way defeated the principle that there is a common law action against the collector
as an individual.
In the principal case the plaintiffs brought the action against the United
States under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1948),' which provides that

5. Rnv. STATS. § 3226 (1878, as amended by Revenue Act of 1932, §
1103(a), 47 STAT. 286 (1932). Now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7422.
6. 126 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. N.Y. 1954).
7. 316 U.S. 258 (1942),
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1948), as amended 65 STAT. 727 (1951), 68 STAT.
589 (1954).
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a taxpayer can obtain a jury trial in suits against the United States in the
federal district courts. The cases appear to have recognized some differences in
approach where the action is against the United States rather than an individual.
Sirian Lamp Co. -v. Manning, supra, stated: "It is true that the section has an
additional purpose in the case of a suit against the United States, but that purpose
does not concern us here."
The case of United States v. Michel,' held that the waiver by the United
States of sovereign immunity from suit in the predecessor to Section 7422 was
to be strictly construed.V 0
Thus, there seems to be reason to believe that the principal case could be
distinguished from the Sirian and Hanchett cases, supra, on the basis that the
statute is to be more strictly construed when the suit is brought against the
United States instead of an individual.
It is doubtful if one would be wise in relying on such a distinction since all
the cases agree that the statutes do affect suits against the collector for some
purposes and there seems to be no real reason for construing the statute less
strongly for one purpose than another.
Even though there is no express provision in the statutes that the entire
tax must be paid prior to a refund suit, there seems to be an implication to that
effect in construing certain statutes together. Section 7421 of the 1954 Code
provides that no suit may be brought to restrain assessment or collection of the
tax except where recourse is had to the Tax Court. The obvious intent of this
provision is to prevent the government from being hindered in the collection of
its revenue by delaying tactics in the courts. The plaintiff's argument in the
principal case, if followed, would effectively negative this section. As a further
point along this line it is well to remember the jeopardy assessment,' which
allows an immediate collection of a tax where it is felt the collection of a deficiency
will be jeopardized by delay. The taxpayer may appeal to the Tax Court, but
this does not stay the government's right to collect the tax.
The language of Section 1346 (a) (1) of Title 28, U.S.C., supra, under which
the action in the principal case was brought, states that district courts have
jurisdiction where the action is for the recovery of "any internal revenue

9. 282 U.S. 656 (1931).
10. Taber v. United States, 59 F.2d 568 (8th Cir. 1932); Bryan v. United
States, 22 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. Okla. 1938); accord, Arabi Packing Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 109 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1940).
11. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6861.
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tax."' - Plaintiffs attempted to show that a requirement that all the taxes be
paid prior to suit was a distortion of the language of this statute. However,
Section 7421 of the 1954 Code uses the words "any tax" in its prohibition of
suits to restrain assessment or collection. To give the plaintiff's interpretation
to Section 1346 (a) (1) of Title 28 would be directly contrary to the meaning of
Section 7421.
In conclusion, it appears that even though there is no express requirement in
the statutes that the tax be paid in full prior to a refund suit, the pervading
tenor of the statutes would require such payment. The cases recognize that the
statutory requirement for the submission of a claim must be met before instituting a suit. There is no reason why the implied requirement of full payment
prior to suit should not be met. However, further clarification of this question
should be undertaken by the courts. If the courts cannot agree on the statutory
interpretation here, then the sections involved should be amended so the intent
of Congress is clarified.
THOD0o
C. BwCKETT

FEDERAL TAXATION-MISAPPROPRIATED
INCOME

PROPERTY AS TAXABLE

Berra v. United States1
Defendant was convicted in United States district court for income tax
evasion. The court of appeals held, inter alia, that where de'fendant, business
manager of a labor welfare organization, arranged with a painting contractor
to overstate his bills to the organization, then approved and paid the bills, and
finally received the amount of overpayment as an illegal "kickback", such receipts constituted taxable income. This notwithstanding the fact that defendant
caused the funds to be repaid, at least in part, to the contractor and to the
organization.
This decision is the latest skirmish in the running battle between the Wilcox'
and Rutkin3 decisions. There were conflicting decisions in the lower courts prior

12. ". . . (a). The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of Claims, of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of
any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any manner
wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws .... "
1. 221 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1955).
2. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
3. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
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to 1946,' and we may consider the Wilcox' holding of the Supreme Court as the
leading case on the question. It held that embezzled funds did not constitute
taxable income. The Court said:'
"The very essence of taxable income . . . is the accrual of some

gain, profit or benefit to the taxpayer."
Further: 7
"... taxable gain is conditioned upon (1) the presence of a claim
of right to the alleged gain and (2) the absence of a definite, unconditional obligation to repay or return that which would otherwise constitute a gain. . . . [T]he bare receipt of property or money wholly
belonging to another lacks the essential characteristics of a gain or
profit....
[T]he taxpayer . . . received the money without any sem-

blance of a bona fide claim of right. And he was at all times under an
"
unqualified duty and obligation to repay ....
The next landmark came six years later with the only subsequent Supreme
Court consideration of the question. The Rutkin case held extorted funds to be
taxable income. The Court said:'
"An unlawful gain, as well as a lawful one, constitutes taxable
income when its recipient has such control over it that, as a practical
matter, he derives readily realizable economic value from it ...
[Citing numerous cases] That occurs when cash, as here, is delivered
by its owner to the taxpayer in a manner which allows the recipient
freedom to dispose of it at will, even though it may have been obtained
by fraud and his freedom to use it may be assailable by someone with a
better title to it."
In this five to four decision the Court avoided the question of overruling the
Wilcox case, expressly limiting that case to its facts. A vigorous dissenting

4. For excellent historical discussions see Geller and Rogers, Embezzlement
Has Its Tax Problems, Too, 26 TAXES 1097 (1948) and Taxation of Misappropriated Property: The Decline and Incomplete Fall of Wilcox, 62 YALE L.J.
662 (1953).
5. Commissioner v. Wilcox, supra note 2. (Income tax deficiency action.
Here the taxpayer was bookkeeper for a transfer company. He was paid a
monthly salary. Upon audit it was discovered that he had converted $12,748.60.
He lost practically all the money in gambling. The company never condoned or
forgave the taking but held him liable to make restitution.)
6. 327 U.S. 404, 407 (1946).
7. Id., at 408.
8. Rutkin v. United States, supra note 3. (Action for income tax evasion.
Here Rutkin had been associated with one Reinfeld in a bootlegging operation.
Several years later Rutkin initiated attempts to extort money from Reinfeld "to
help him pay his debts." After repeated threats on the lives of Reinfeld and
his family, Rutkin's efforts culminated in the payment to him of $250,000 cash
which the government contended was taxable income.)
9. 343 U.S. 130, 137 (1952).
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opinion pointed out 0 that the embezzler and the extortioner are in precisely the
same situation as to their lack of bona fide legal or equitable claim, their obligation to repay and the consequent absence of gain or income.
An attempt has been made in subsequent inferior court decisions to rationalize these two decisions on the tenuous ground that the embezzler secures
no title to the funds while the extortioner and swindler do have a voidable title.
Several courts have demonstrated that these subtleties of the local criminal
and property law have no place in the determination of federal tax liability."
A recent Yale Law Journal note 2 raised the logical speculation that even the
embezzler might acquire legal title after the statute of limitations has run, and
thus acquire taxable income under the Wilcox doctrine. The further objection
frequently raised to the taxation of misappropriated funds, that it puts the
federal government into the field of local law enforcement,"2 is utterly refuted by
the obvious fact that such ill-gotten gains, if taxable, must not be allowed to
escape while the law-abiding taxpayer continues to support the government."
These actions are prosecuted to determine federal income tax liability, not to
determine criminal liability for misappropriation.
The effect, if not the intent, of the Rutkin decision has been to overrule the
Wilcox case, as we shall see from an examination of the subsequent decisions
of the inferior courts. The Rutkin tests of "control" and "readily realizable
economic value" have been substituted for the "claim of right" test formulated
in Wilcox.
Rollinger v. United States' held that funds obtained by swindling or false

10. Id, at 139.
11. Ibid. (At p. 140: "...
we must generally assume, in the absence of a
plain indication to the contrary, that Congress when it enacts a statute is not
making the application of the federal act dependent on state law."); Marienfeld
v. United States, 214 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1954) (At p. 636: "But the present
question is not whether appellant was guilty of embezzlement under the law of
Missouri, but whether the funds he received were his income under the Act of
Congress defining taxable income."); Briggs v. United States, 214 F.2d 699
(4th Cir. 1954) (At p. 700: "We need not go into the question as to whether
they were guilty of embezzlement under the North Carolina statutes. .. .")
12. 62 YALE L. J. 662 (1953) (At p. 667: "Under the Wilcox rationale,
voidable title or the absence of title does not exempt misappropriated property
from taxation permanently but merely postpones liability until the victim's
forgiveness or the running of the statute of limitations bestows good title upon
the wrongdoer.")
13. Rutkin v. United States, supra note 3. (Mr. Justice Black, dissenting,
343 U.S. 130 at 141: "Insofar as the United States is concerned, many think
that taking over enforcement of local criminal laws lowers the prestige of the
federal system of justice. . . . Federal encroachment upon local criminal jurisdiction can also be very injurious to the states.")
14. Id., at 137: "There is no adequate reason why assailable unlawful gains
should be treated differently in this respect from assailable lawful gains. Certainly there is no reason for treating them more leniently."
15. 208 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1953) (Action for income tax evasion. Here
defendant swindled his victim by selling her zircons as diamonds. He also
extorted money from her for "protection" in these questionable transactions.)
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pretenses and by extortion were taxable. The court discussed Wilcox and Rutkin
and pointed out that here the money was wrongfully acquired in the first
instance.
Kann v. Commissioner' held embezzled funds taxable. The court openly
questioned the fact of any real distinction between Wilcox and Rutkin. It
proceeded to distinguish this case on the ground that the taxpayers had not
been forced to repay the funds, thus completely dropping the pretense that
embezzled funds are not taxable per se.
Marienfeld v. United States " is one of the best examples of the lengths to
which the courts have been forced to go in their tightrope attempts to follow both
Wilcox and Rutkin. Speaking of embezzled funds, Johnsen, C.J. (concurring
specially), said:"3
"If criminally acquired funds are at all to be subjected to tax
liability . . . that liability . . . can only and needs only to be predicated
upon the simple and solid basis under the statute of actual economic
gain, value and enjoyment having existed to the criminal."
Continuing: 9
"The Rutkin case is not capable of any practical application or workability, if it is to be used merely to make artificial refinements in fact
situations to escape the Wilcox case."
Briggs v. United States2 0 involved illegal "kickbacks" to a corporate officer.
Here defendant made restitution after he was caught. The court said that the
question of defendant's guilt of any particular offense under the definitions of
local criminal law was immaterial. It applied the Rutkin tests in holding the
gains taxable.

16. 210 F.2d 247 (3rd Cir. 1953) (Action for income tax deficiency. Here
funds were improperly obtained from a corporation by the taxpayers, who were
twenty-five per cent shareholders and top officers. The money was obtained by
means of understated sales and overstated purchases. They were not prosecuted
for misappropriation but were in a position to repay if necessary.)
17. 214 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1954) (Action for income tax evasion. Defendant
had an agreement with a meatpacker authorizing him to sell meat products on
the packer's behalf. Defendant converted some of the proceeds and some of the
products to his own use.)
18. Id. at 639.
19. Id. at 640.
20. 214 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1954) (Prosecution for filing false and fraudulent income tax returns. Defendant corporation superintendent was authorized
to secure bids on land which the corporation wished to sell. Co-defendant secured
buyers to whom the land was sold at prices exceeding those reported to the corporation. Defendants split their illicit profits.)
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United States v. Brushwitz" held commercial "kickbacks" taxable.
court said:"

The

"It is difficult to perceive what, if anything, is left of the Wilcox
holding after Rutkin . . . , which ruled that moneys received by extortion were within Sec. 2 2 (a). Certainly the whole approach of the later
case, stressing actual possession and control, is diametrically opposed
to the 'claim of right' criterion of the earlier case. The reconciliation
evolved by other circuits seems to be that even temporary dominion over
illicit gains is sufficient to render them taxable in the hands of the
holder thereof. . . . [Citing numerous cases] Although eminently justified by the Rutkin holding, this formulation in effect does what the
Supreme Court purported not to do; it overrules the Wilcox case."
In some of these recent cases the defrauded party has asserted his claim
for restitution, in others he has apparently condoned the taking. The decisions
have been rendered with virtually no reference to this point. This is in accord
with the familiar doctrine that income is taxable during the year of receipt,"
regardless of subsequent liability to repay in another year. While the severity
of this holding has been mitigated by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954j"' the
relief therein afforded applies only to funds held under a bona fide claim of right
It would undoubtedly not apply to misappropriated funds.
The reports of these recent inferior court decisions read like a broken record.
The Wilcox case is always cited as a defense and it consistently fails. No
contrary holding has been discovered. The law seems to be virtually settled
that misappropriated funds constitute taxable income, whether retained or not,
and regardless of the particular crime involved in the taking. This seems to be
a logical and salutary position.
Fann H. MAUGHER, J.

21. 219 F.2d 59 (2nd Cir. 1955) (Prosecution for income tax evasion. Defendants failed to report commercial bribes received from persons interested in
doing business with their employers.)
22. Id. at 61.
23. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951). (Here the taxpayer was
forced to refund part of a bonus two years after he had received it and reported
it as income. The court held that he could not amend his former return but
could only deduct the amount as a loss in the year of refund. The court said,
at p. 591: "If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and without
restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required to
return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the
money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent.")
24. Sec. 1341 (a). (This section provides for a recomputation of income for
the original year of receipt in cases where the subsequent repayment exceeds
$3,000.)
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PROPERTY-ADVERSE POSSESSION-BY GRANTOR-ESTOPPEL OF
TENANT TO DENY LANDLORD'S TITLE
American National Bank of Beaumont v. Wingate'
A tract of land containing 520 acres was enclosed by a fence but had no
interior partition fences. Portions of the tract were used in occasional years
for raising rice; otherwise it was devoted to grazing. Mrs. Wingate's sister
owned 85 acres; Mrs. Wingate owned the rest of the tract. In 1937 Mrs. Wingate
conveyed 175 acres to the bank in payment of a debt. In the following year she
repaired the fence around the 520 acre tract, including 2,481 feet of fence on
the land conveyed to the bank, and gave her son-in-law, Kiker, permission to
raise rice on any part of the 520 acre tract for as long as he wished. Kiker
raised rice in the years 1938, 1942, 1944, 1948 and 1950 and paid Mrs. Wingate
rent for the use of the land in those years. Kiker did not know that Mrs.
Wingate was claiming the 175 acres adversely and thought that the rent he was
paying her was for the use of the rest of the tract. Unknown to Mrs. Wingate,
Kiker also secured permission from the bank to raise rice in the years 1942, 1944,
1948 and 1950 and paid rent to the bank for doing so. In the intervening years,
Mrs. Wingate used the whole 520 acre tract for grazing. In 1951 Mrs. Wingate
sued the bank to establish title in herself to the 175 acres which she had conveyed
to it in 1937 on the basis of ten years adverse possession. The bank contended
that the continuity of her adverse possession was interrupted by the possession
of Kiker in the years during which he paid rent to it. A judgment for Mrs.
Wingate was reversed by the court of civil appeals.
In its decision, the appellate court considered the following legal propositions.
1. A grantor who continues in possession after his conveyance cannot acquire title by adverse possession unless he puts the grantee on notice of his
adverse claim.
2. A grantor who surrenders possession and later retakes it does not have
to give such notice of adversity.
3. The general rule of the estoppel of a tenant to deny his landlord's title.
4. The inapplicability of the general rule of estoppel when the tenant does
not take possession under lease or agreement with the landlord.
5. The statute of limitations running in favor of an adverse claimant is
not interrupted by a secret ouster.

1. 266 S.W.2d 934 (Texas Civ. App. 1953).
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If the grantor was in possession of the land conveyed by him at the time of
his deed, and continued in possession after the conveyance, making the same use
of the land as he did before his deed, his possession is presumed to be that of one
holding under the title which was conveyed. The grantee may assume that the
grantor's holding is subservient to the title conveyed to him until he receives
notice or is charged with notice to the contrary. The grantee is not required to
anticipate that the grantor will attempt to gain an adverse claim. This is in
accord with the general rule that one in possession who has recognized the title
of another must give notice that he has ceased to hold the land in subservience
and has become an adverse claimant.2 There is disagreement as to what amounts
to sufficient notice. Some authorities apply the general rule that possession is
notice of all rights of the possessor, thus making the continued possession of the
grantor quite as sufficient as notice of his claims as the possession of a stranger
to the record title would be.' These authorities support this view by saying that
since by the terms of the deed, the grantor has no right of possession, his continuing possession gives notice that he has rights not expressed in the deed, and
presumably based on an adverse claim. The greater number of the cases however, take the position that the possession of a grantor of land after conveyance
is not inconsistent wih the title which he has conveyed, and that therefore, one of
the elements of constructive notice is lacking. This reasoning is reinforced by
the fact that the rule that possession is notice was intended to protect the possessor of real estate from the acts of others who do not derive their title from him,
and not to protect him against his own acts, especially against his own deeds."
But under the proper circumstances the grantor can reacquire title by adverse possession. And where the grantor has surrendered possession for a substantial period, a subsequent re-entry brings a new possession and no additional
notice of the adverse claim is necessary to set the statute of limitations in motion.'
Evidence in this case tended to show that at least a year intervened between the
appellee's deed and the restoration and repair of the fence with which she says
her adverse claim began. The court was convinced that this evidence was sufficient to show that Mrs. Wingate had in fact surrendered possession of the land

2. Jay v. Whelchel, 78 Ga. 786 (1887); Iowa Cent. Ry. v. Homan, 151 Iowa
404, 131 N.W. 878 (1911); Sellers v. Crossan, 52 Kan. 570, 35 Pac. 205 (1893);
Nugent v. Peterman, 137 Mich. 646, 100 N.W. 895 (1904); 2 C.J.S. 652, § 95;
AM. LAW OF PRorRTY § 15.7, n. 9 (1952); Note, 105 A.L.R. 845-880 (1936).
3. Pell v. McElroy, 36 Cal. 268 (1868); Groff v. State Bank, 50 Minn. 234,
52 N.W. 561 (1892) ; Bridger v. Exchange Bank, 126 Ga. 821, 56 S.E. 97, 8 L.R.A.
463 (1906).
4. Malette v. Wright, 120 Ga. 735, 48 S.E. 229 (1904); Hafter v. Strange,
65 Miss. 323, 3 So. 190 (1887); Hockman v. Thuma, 68 Kan. 519, 75 Pac. 486
(1904); Tutt v. Smith, 201 Iowa 107, 204 N.W. 294, 48 A.L.R. 394 (1925);
McCarty v. Broneaugh, 128 Okla. 36, 261 Pac. 165 (1927); McKinley v. Crawford, 61 App. D.C. 123, 58 F.2d 528 (C.A. D.C. 1932) ; 105 A.L.R. 849 (1936).
5. Bird v. Whetstone, 71 Kan. 430, 80 Pac. 942 (1905); Horbach v. Boyd,
64 Neb. 129, 89 N.W. 644 (1902); 2 C.J.S. 655.
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and that the subsequent re-entry acquired an adverse nature without the necessity of further notice to the grantee.
The appellate court, in arriving at its decision, expressed acceptance of the
established rule that, in the absence of mistake or fraud in the procurement of
the lease, a tenant is estopped to deny the title of his landlord unless there is
consent by the landlord or unless such denial is made as a consequence of a judgment, order, or decree of court.' One effect of this rule is that the recognition
of the title of a third person by one occupying land as the tenant of an adverse
claimant, without the latter's knowledge, does not interrupt the continuity of the
landlord's possession.' The court held, however, that the facts of this case brought
it within an exception to the estoppel rule to the effect that the rule does not
apply unless the tenant takes or retains possession under the lease.' The theory
of the exception is that, as the doctrine that the tenant cannot deny the landlord's title is based on public policy to encourage honesty and good faith between
the landlord and tenant, it has no application when the tenant is not in possession of the premises under the lease.' While this exception has been generally
accepted where the action was for ejectment or in any suit to try the title to
to land,"' there is disagreement where the action is for rent, or is brought on the
covenants of the lease. Some authorities apply the exception in such cases,1" but
the most widely accepted view apparently is that in such actions on the covenant
or for rent, the lessee cannot deny his landlord's title in any event unless he has
been unable to obtain or retain possession because of his landlord's want of title."
The latter view was based, not on estoppel, but rather on a purely contractual
theory of liability." Other exceptions to the estoppel rule have been recognized.
An attornment by the tenant of an adverse possessor to the true owner has been
held effective to stop the running of the statute of limitations in favor of the

6. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Louisville and N. R.R., 250 Fed. 199
(5th Cir. 1918); San Juan Gold Co. v. San Juan Ridge Mutual Water Assoc., 34
Cal. App.2d 159, 93 P.2d 582 (1939); Thompson v. Pioche, 44 Cal. 508 (1872);
Chayne v. Quackenbush, 198 Ia. 420, 199 N.W. 267 (1924); Jackson v. Ward,
292 S.W. 7 (Mo. 1927); Schultz v. Arnot, Lindall, S3 Mo. 172 (1862); Clark v.
Keith, 86 Okla. 156, 207 Pac. 87 (1922) ; Putnam Co. v. Fisher, 128 W. Va. 383,
36 S.E. 2d 681 (1945); 51 C.J.S. 909; 32 Am. JuR. 108.
7. Ellsworth v. Eslick, 91 Kan. 287, 137 Pac. 973 (1914) ; Middlesboro Waterworks Co. v. Neal, 105 Ky. 586, 49 S.W. 428 (1899) Jackson v. Ward, 292 S.W. 7
(Mo. 1927); Powell Lumber Co. v. Nobles, 44 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. 1931).
8. Stowers v. Huntington Development and Gas Co., 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir.
1934) ; Grim v. Nelms, 78 Ala. 604 (1885) ; Ireton v. Ireton, 59 Kan. 92, 52 Pac.
74 (1898) ; Foster v. Focht, 102 Okla. 261, 229 Pac. 444 (1924) ; 32 AM. JUR. 110;
See note in 98 A.L.R. 549 (1935).
9. Stowers v. Huntington Development and Gas Co., supr-a note 4.
10. Foster v. Focht; Crim v. Nelms; 98 A.L.R. 549, supra note 4.
11. 32 Am. JuR. 110.
12. Hodges v. Waters, 124 Ga. 229, 52 S.E. 161 (1905); Hawkins v. Collier,
101 Ga. 145, 28 S.E. 632 (1897); Lockwood v. Carter Oil Co., 73 W. Va. 175, 80
S.E. 814 (1913).
13. 3 Am.LAW OF PROPERTY 812 (1952).
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adverse possessor." Many of the cases base this result on the lack of knowledge
in the true owner of the existence of a tenancy relationship, on the theory that
a landlord having notice of an adverse claim is bound to initiate proceedings
against an adverse claimant," but another view has it that such knowledge or
lack of it is immaterial since the new lease ousts the tenant under his lease from
the adverse possessor."l
In the case at bar, the court felt that it was unnecessary to deal directly
with the rule of estoppel of the tenant to deny his landlord's possession, since the
court found the facts to show that the tenant had neither taken nor held possession of the property under the 1938 agreement with the appellee.' Since Kiker
did not know of Mrs. Wingate's adverse claim, he did not take possession of the
175 acres under the 1938 agreement. This finding by the court left only one major
problem for consideration, that of secret ouster. The appellee's allegation was
that, being secret, the entry of the bank by its tenant Kiker was not sufficient
to stop the running of the statute of limitations. The accepted rule is that the
owner's entry to stop the running of the statute cannot be casual, accidental,
permissive or secret. 8 The burden of proving that the owner's entry was not
sufficient is on the one claiming by adverse possession, since the adverse claimant
must show that his prescriptive possession has not been interrupted."' The reentry of the true owner must be equal in dignity to the entry of the adverse possessor," that is, there must either be an express declaration of the intent to
repossess or else such acts as will notoriously manifest an intention of so doing. 1
The court in the instant case found that the proximity of the appellee to the
land being cultivated by Kiker, plus the fact that after 1936 Kiker never knowingly paid rent to the appellee for any of the land owned by the bank, were
circumstances obviating any claim by the appellee that there had been re-entry
by stealth. This case appears to be in line with prior authority and reason, when
it is recognized that the tenant did not hold possession of the land under the adverse claimant at the time he entered into the agreement with the bank.
G. ANDY RUNn

14. Thompson v. Pioche, supra note 2; Van Devanter v. Lott, 172 Fed. 574
(C.C. E.D. N.Y. 1909); Van Devanter v. Lott, 180 Fed. 378 (2d Cir. 1910);
Koons v. Steele, 19 Pa. 202 (1852); La. and Texas Lumber Go. v. Alexander,
154 S.W. 233 (Tex. 1913). Contra: Kimble v. Willey, 204 F.2d 238 (8th Cir.
1953); see note 38 A.L.R.2d 814 (1953); 1 Aw. LAW oF PROPERTY § 3.65, p. 317,
n. 8 (1954 Supp.).
15. Cases cited in note 10 supra. See note in 6 OrA. L. Ray. 216 (1953).
16. 3 Am. LAw OF PROPERTY § 15.9.
17. Smith v. So. Pac. R.R., 1 Cal.2d 272, 34 P.2d 713 (1934); Ahern v. The
Travelers Insurance Co., 108 Conn. 1, 142 Atl. 400 (1928); Burrows v. Gallup, 32
Conn. 493 (1865); Nelson v. Johnson, "189 Ky. 815, 226 S.W. 94 (1920).
18. Lamoille County Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. A. Moresi Ltd., 195 So.
787 (La. App. 1940); Barbee v. Bumpass, 191 N.C. 521, 132 S.E. 275 (1926).
19. Smith v. So. Pac. R.R., supra note 13.
20. Nelson v. Johnson, 189 Ky. 815, 226 S.W. 94 (1920); Batchelder v. Robbins, 93 Me. 579, 45 Atl. 837 (1900); Ransom v. Lewis, 63 N.C. 43 (1868).
21. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 3 (Student Ed. 1938).
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REAL PROPERTY-EASEMENTS-PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHT-PRESUMPTION THAT USER IS PERMISSIVE OR ADVERSE
Miller v. Berry'
Plaintiff, Alma Miller, owned a forty acre tract of land, north of and adjoining a forty acre tract belonging to defendants, the Berrys. The roadway in
dispute ran generally in a north and south direction; the boundary fence opening was closed by means of a gate. This roadway ran from the house on the
Miller tract south through the boundary fence between the two tracts and passed
through another fence near the south boundary of the Berry tract, where it connected with a road running to Malden, Missouri.
Plaintiff asserted an easement acquired by prescriptive right over this road,
asserting actual, adverse, continuous, hostile, open and notorious use of the roadway under claim of right for more than ten years, and sought to enjoin the
defendants from obstructing the road by a post placed in the middle of the road.
The trial court granted a permanent injunction and the defendants appealed to
the Springfield Court of Appeals. That court reversed the trial court's decision
and remanded the cause with direction to dismiss plaintiff's bill for want of
equity.
The appellate court discussed the requisites for an easement by prescription.
The court stated that there must be open, visible, continuous and uninterrupted
use, and the use must have been both adverse and under claim of right. If the
use be permissive, the court went on, no adverse user arises. The permissive
use can be transformed into an adverse user by "'.. . a distinct and positive assertion of a right hostile to the owner, and brought home to him . . .' "' Evidence
adduced by both parties resulted in the conclusion that the use was permissive
only, and the right to pass over the defendant's land was a mere revocable
license.
The court recognized the presumption that "...
in case of doubt or uncertainty as to the character of the use, it will be presumed to have been permissive . . .'" This presumption seems to conflict with another presumption also
stated by the court (Emphasis the court's.): "'. . . the burden is upon the
claimant to show the adverse character of the use; but in the absence of some
showing that the use was permissive in its origin it is well settled that when one
claims an easement by prescription and shows an open, continuous, visible and

1. 270 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. App. 1954).
2. Id., p. 668.
3. Id., pp. 670-671, citing 39 C.J.S. § 23, p. 942 and Anson v. Tietze, 354 Mo.
552, 190 S.W.2d 193, 199 (1945). See also 25 Am. JuR. § 47, p. 366 and 1 AM.
Jun. § 238, p. 925.
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uninterrupted use for the period of the 10-year statute of limitations, the burden
is cast upon the landowner to show that the use was permissive, rather than
adverse, if he claims it to have been so.' "I
If no evidence concerning permissive use is introduced, or if the evidence is
doubtful or uncertain, which presumption is followed? Is the use presumed permissive, or adverse, requiring the alleged servient landowner to prove permission?
The Missouri cases on the presumption are not clear. Some cases apply a
presumption that user is adverse, others apply a presumption that the user is
permissive. Where the land in question is wild, waste or uninclosed land, the
presumption of permissive use is generally followed.r The presumption of adverse user is followed in most cases where prescriptive rights in improved, inclosed or occupied land are claimed.' As noted in Sellers V. Swehla,7 there is
... no presumption that use of land as a way by the public was without the
permission of the owner.'" (Emphasis the court's.)
In the Anson case,8 the land in dispute was uninclosed but improved. It was
used for general farming purposes' after a building used for education was
destroyed. The court followed the presumption of permissive use. According to
most Missouri cases, the presumption of adverse user, not permissive user,
should have been applied. As is stated in 170 A.L.R. 776 at p. 820: "The term
'uninclosed' is the most frequently used, but it is misleading, and has occasionally
led a court to confuse the subject by invoking the principle in the case of vacant
lots or blocks in an urban district, though cleared and cared for. Obviously, it
cannot apply to a residential lawn, though uninclosed. The most appropriate
terms [sic] is 'unimproved' . . ." The principle referred to in the quotation is
that where the user is of wild land, woodland, or other land in a general state of
nature, a presumption is raised that the use is permissive. The Anson case prob-

4. Id., p. 668.
5. Burnett v. Sladek, 251 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Mo. App. 1952) [uninclosed and
unimproved]; Zinser v. Lucks, 361 Mo. 671, 235 S.W.2d 844, 849 (1951) noted in
17 Mo. L. Rzy. 103 (1952) [uninclosed land and unimproved]; Marshall v. Callahan, 229 S.W.2d 730, 732, 734 (Mo. App. 1950) [unimproved]; but see Anson v.
Tietze, 354 Mo. 552, 190 S.W.2d 193, 199 (1945) [uninclosed but used for
farming].
6. Robbins v. Anderson, 274 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. App. 1955) roccupied 1 ; Sellers v. Swehla (en Banc), 261 S.W.2d 26, 32 (Mo. 1953) [rule quoted, decision on
another ground]; Meyer v. Everett, 235 S.W.2d 130, 136 (Mo. App. 1950) [improved and occupied land]; Smith v. Santarelli, 207 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Mo. App.
1948) [improved]; Fassold v. Schamburg, 350 Mo. 464, 166 S.W.2d 571, 572
(1942) [occupied, improved timber land]; Rosendahl v. Buecker, 27 S.W.2d 471,
472 (Mo. App. 1930) [improved]. See also cases cited in notes four and five of
the opinion in the principal case. Cf. Anthony v. Kennard Bldg. Co., 188 Mo. 704
87 S.W. 921, 924 (1905) and Pitzman v. Boyce, 111 Mo. 387, 19 S.W. 1104, 1105
(1892) [cases involving the presumption of a grant after user for the prescribed
period].
7. Supra, note 6.
8. Supra, note 5.
9. Id., p. 197.
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ably should have gone off on the presumption of adverse user, since the land was
improved and used for farming, apparently within the city limits of Sedalia,
Missouri.
What will happen in Missouri in a case where the claimant presents no
evidence that the user was non-permissive, and the alleged servient owner presents
no evidence that user was permissive? Will permissive user be presumed,"0 or
must the landowner prove permission?"' The general rule in this country is a
presumption that user is adverse, after a showing of the elements of the applicable number of years of user, openly, continuously, and uninterruptedly. The
presumption would not survive some substantial evidence of permission, express
or implied, given by the servient owner to the claimant.
In the writer's opinion, the proper presumption in cases involving improved
land is the presumption of adverse user. This presumption would be created by
the claimant showing open, continuous, visible and uninterrupted use for a period
of ten years or more. There should be no presumption of adverse user in cases
involving unimproved land. On the contrary, in the latter case the presumption
should be that of permissive user to permit travel over unimproved land which
causes the owner no serious harm or damage. The claimant should be required to
prove the adverse nature of his use in the unimproved land situation, without
benefit of a presumption of adverse user.
AxrN S. PARISH

PROPERTY-RACIAL RESTRICTIONS ON USE AND OWNERSHIP
1
Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Barringer

Prior to Shelley v. Kraemer' there was considerable diversity of opinion as
to the validity of racial restrictions in deeds. Shelley v. Kraemer held that
decreeing specific performance of a covenant providing for racial restrictions
constituted state action in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but the court stated that the covenants were good as between
the parties. Barrows v. Jackson' decided that damages for breach of a racial

10. See note 3.
11. See note 4.
12. 170 A.L.R. 776, 778 (1947).
1. 88 S.E.2d 114 (N.C. 1955).
2. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See Betz, Note, 12 Mo. L. REv. 221 (1947). Also
Eckhardt, 14 Mo. L. Rnv. 371 (1949).
S. 346 U.S. 249 (1953), commented on in Lewis, 19 Mo. L. REv. 57, 58
(1954). See also Weiss v. Leason, 225 S.W.2d 127 (1949), discussed in Hoelscher,
Note, 15 Mo. L. REv. 313 (1950), which had held contra.
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covenant constituted state action denying equal protection. This ended the
practical value of such covenants and title insurance companies will insure
against them. The problem of the conveyancer has become one of selecting a
technique of conveyancing sufficient to effect racial restrictions without violating
the Fourteenth Amendment." In this note only the legal aspects of the problem
are considered, and the sociological aspects of the question have been excluded.
Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Barringer,the principal case,
raises the question of the validity of racial restrictions in a somewhat new light.
The case involved a grant of lands to the city of Charlotte to be used for park
purposes only, and provided for a reversion to the grantor if such lands were
ever used by non-whites. On a part of the lands so conveyed the park operated
a golf course which was the only golf course operated by the city. Negroes
petitioned the Park Commission demanding the right to use the golf course. The
Commission brought action under the local declaratory judgment act. The North
Carolina Supreme Court held that the limitation created a valid determinable
fee, and in the event of non-white use the land would automatically revert to
the grantor. The court further held that the operation of the revisionary provision was not by any judicial enforcement by the state courts of North Carolina
and that Shelley v. Kraemer had no application.
Several recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have held that
Negroes are entitled to equal facilities.' Under the North Carolina ruling, if

4. Several methods, in addition to those discussed in this note, have been
used to effect racial restrictions. Among these are covenants giving adjoining
lot owners options to purchase on the terms of an offered or contracted sale.
If these options are unlimited as to time, they may violate the Rule Against
Perpetuities, Barton v. Thaw, 246 Pa. 348, 92 Atl. 312 (1914); contra, Keogh
v. Peck, 316 I1. 318, 147 N.E. 266 (1925). See also Lux v. Lewis, 213 S.W.2d
315 (Mo. 1948) and discussion by Hoelscher, Use of Options to Purchase Land
to Control Occupancy, 15 Mo. L. Rnv. 77 (1950), taking the view that such
covenants, unrestricted as to time, are void in Missouri under the Rule Against
Perpetuities. Such options if applicable to any proposed sale and not just limited
to proposed sales to members of minority groups, would on their face be enforceable.
Another method used in metropolitan centers is the trust arrangement
plan, discussed briefly in 1 BAYLOR L. Rav. 20, 43 (1952), which provides for
legal title to be held by a corporate trustee while control remains with the actual
owners.
Another method involves a long term lease in which the lessor retains veto
power over prospective assignees.
A method used to some extent is the club system which is applicable chiefly
to new developments. Prospective purchasers are required to have the unanimous
or substantial majority approval of prior purchasers (club members) in the
development.
Each of these methods involves the possibility of litigation, and to the extent
that each depends on such litigation for enforcement, each runs the risk of being
declared unenforceable by an extension of the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer.
5. See Lewis, Recent Cases and Trends Inv.olving the Issue of Racial
Discrimination,19 Mo. L. Rav. 57, 64 (1954) and citations there. The supreme
court recently has struck down all segregation in public parks, playgrounds, and
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Negroes use the golf course, the land will revert to the grantor. Thus it would
seem that the limitation is useless, for all practical purposes, to effect segregated
public user. For if the court's opinion is allowed to stand, the land will revert
to the grantor upon user by the excluded minority group. If the court's opinion
is overruled, the special limitation will be of no effect and therefore valueless.
The case raises the question, however, of the use of either a special limitation
or a condition subsequent in effecting racial restrictions on the use of residential
property. The event upon which the limitation or condition would operate might
be either the attempted sale of the land or the use of the land by a member of the
excluded race. Three problems would seem to be involved: 6 does the limitation
or condition violate the public policy of the state? does it violate the rule against
restraints on alienation? and, does it violate the Fourteenth Amendment? It
appears that such limitations and conditions are neither against the public policy
nor a violation of the rule against restraints on alienation in Missouri and some
other states.' If the condition or limitation is as to the use of the property, it
would appear less likely to be an unlawful restraint on alienation.' Whether the
limitation or condition would violate the Fourteenth Amendment is an open
question. The particular problem has not been much litigated because the effectiveness of restrictive covenants prior to Shelley '. Kraemer reduced the number
of conveyances using this means of racially restricting property.
In theory, at least, if a possibility of reverter is retained, the estate automatically reverts by operation of law to the grantor upon the happening of the
event. The theory of the grantor's suit to regain possession is that the court
should recognize a title already vested in fee simple in him. Whether the Supreme
Court of the United States would take the view asserted by the court in Charlotte
Park and Recreation Commission v. Barringer is an open question.' Self-help

golf courses, upholding a circuit court decision which had said the doctrine of
separate but equal facilities for Whites and Negroes was dead, Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 76 Sup. Ct. 133 (1955). In accord, Holmes
v. City of Atlanta, 76 Sup. Ct. 141 (1955).
6. 41 Am. JuR., Perpetuitiesand Restraints on Alienation, § 31.
7. Koelhler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217, 9 A.L.R. 107 (1918).
See also McGovney, 32 CALIF. L. R.v. 5, 33 (1945), which lists the states holding
both ways.
8. See Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596,
9 A.L.R. 115 (1919), which was the first decision to accept as material the
difference between restraints on occupancy and restraints on alienation. But
see also 33 CAL. L. REv. 5, 8, note 17 (1945), where it is argued that ". . . one
of the incidents of ownership is the privilege of residing on the land. Analytical
jurists tell us that 'alienation' involves destruction of the rights of the grantor
and creating similar rights in the grantee. If one of the rights of the grantor
cannot be re-created in the grantee, the grantor's power Df alienation is curtailed."
9. 32 MIcH. L. REv.721, 731 (1934), ". . . it is difficult to determine when
the activity of the state is so secondary as not to be within the constitutional
interdiction. When legislative authority is given for the discrimination, it is
generally held that there is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. There

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol21/iss1/9

30

et al.: Recent Cases
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

repossession, discussed in the next paragraph in connection with a right of entry
for condition broken, is equally applicable to a possibility of reverter.
Another possibility is the use of a right of entry for condition broken. It
would seem to be obvious that under Shelley v. Kraemer a grantor cannot seek
the aid of a state court to regain possession in an action of ejectment. A different
case is presented, however, where the grantor recovers possession through self
help.'" Query whether a refusal by a state court to help the dispossessed party
regain possession constitutes state action under Shelley V. Kraemer?"
Assuming constitutionality, the grantor's reservation of a right of entry or
a possibility of reverter is subject to certain practical difficulties. The grantor
has, in effect, excluded a large number of potential buyers from purchasing the
land. Where the character of the neighborhood has changed, it might be desirable
from both an economical and sociological point of view for the owner of the
defeasible or determinable fee to be able to sell to a member of the excluded
race.1
At present it is doubtful whether special limitations or conditions subsequent
can effect racial restrictions. Should the supreme court decide in favor of. their
constitutionality, the lawyer should draft conveyances containing such conditions
subsequent on special limitations with an eye toward flexibility.
WALTEP F. MOUDY

does not seem to be great deal of difference between such a situation and one
where the authority is found in the common law of the state."
10. Under the common law there was no civil remedy against a person who,
having a right, entered forcibly, Krevet v. Meyer, 24 Mo. 107 (1856); Fuhr v.
Dean, 26 Mo. 116 (1857). But modern forcible entry and detainer statutes in
Missouri provide a remedy for one forcibly dispossessed, Mo. REv. STAT. §§
534.010, 534.020 (1949). Under these statutes very little force is necessary.
These statutes do not invalidate the legal effect of such entry, however, and in
the absence of actual injury to person or property, damages are nominal, Levy
v. McClintock, 141 Mo. App. 593, 125 S.W. 546 (1910); Chappel v. Lubrite
Refining Co., 337 Mo. 791, 85 S.W.2d 1034 (1935).
11. Title insurance companies writing Missouri title insurance will not insure
against a forfeiture type of racial restriction.
12. See Fratcher, Defeasance as a Restrictive Device in Michigan, 52 MIcir.
L. Rav. 505 (1954), taking the view that a right of entry is a legal property
interest which is not cut off or affected by a change in circumstances.
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TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY

OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION

WHERE INJURY OCCURS ON PREMISES RENTED TO OTHERS
Blatt v. George H. Nettleton Home for Aged Women
This was a suit for a personal injury caused by the negligent keeping of a
common stairway in the office building owned by the defendant corporation.
The plaintiff was injured while on the premises as a business invitee of one of
the tenants of the building. The defendant is a private charitable organization
which was founded and is maintained to provide living place for aged, needy
women. The entire net profits from the rent received go directly to the upkeep
of the home. The defendants do not, however, occupy any part of the building
in question, but rent the entire space out to various business tenants. The only
issue in the case was whether or not the defendant was entitled to immunity
as a charitable organization; if not, there was no question that the plaintiff
had presented facts entitling him to damages. It was held by the Missouri
Supreme Court en bano that the doctrine of immunity of charitable organizations did not apply in this case because the mere use of the net profits of the
rent did not constitute a direct relation to the purpose for which the charity was
founded. The court said that they would not pass on what constituted the necessary relation, but would leave that question to be decided by the facts of the
individual case.
This case is one of first impression in Missouri on the facts. The doctrine
that charitable organizations are immune to liability for their torts seems to have
been first advocated in the English case of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross.2 It was
said that it was contrary to all sense of reason and justice that the intentions
of the donors should be so converted. The first time the problem was litigated
in Missouri was in 1907, in the case of Adams v. University Hospital,' where
it was held that to allow damages to be collected would discourage charitable
contributions, the court citing the case of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross as the leading
authority. The thought was reiterated that it would outrage every sense of
justice to so deplete funds which had been set aside and were intended to be
used entirely for charitable purposes.
In the next Missouri case, that of Whittaker v. St. Luke's Hospital,4 the
court in deciding against the plaintiff made the point that the distinction between
a public and private charity, if any, was not a sound one. However, the court
refused to go any further than the facts of the immediate case required. They

1.
2.
3.
4.

275 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. 1955).
12 Cl. and Fin. 507 (1846).
122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S.W. 453 (1907).
137 Mo. App. 116, 117 S.W. 1189 (1908).
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stated that there might be some facts which would justify holding the charity
to liability. The doctrine was established more firmly in the case of Nicholas
v. Evangelical Deaconess Home and Hospital.' The case decided that the charitable organization, in this case a hospital, was immune even though the injured
party was a paying patient and not a recipient of the charity. Then followed
Roberts v. Kirksville College' in which the opinion was largely based on the
decision in the above cited case.
The doctrine seemed to be broadened in the case of Eads v. Y.W.C.A. ' The
facts in this case were peculiar and different from those in the preceding Missouri cases, since part of the building owned by the defendant was rented to
tenants and defendants occupied only the third floor, which was used as a
reading room by the Association. The court said that the Y.W.C.A. was not
taken out of the doctrine of charitable immunity merely because part of the
building was rented out. The elevator was still used by the Association to take
people to the reading room and as such it was directly connected to its charitable works. Thus it seemed that the doctrine had survived a stern test and
was growing broader. The case of Stedem v. Jewish Memorial Hospital Association8 added little to the concept, except that it held that the charitable organization was not liable merely because it was insured against liability. The idea was
advanced that the doctrine was founded in Missouri on both the "trust fund"
and "public policy" theories. In Dille v. St. Lukes Hospital' the court definitely
approved the "trust fund" and "public policy" theories as the basis of the
doctrine in Missouri. The United States District Court sitting in St. Louis in
the case of Hinman v. Beekman said the doctrine seemed firmly established in
Missouri.1"
Thus from a review of all the Missouri cases it would not have been surprising had the doctrine been applied in the principal case. This view seems to
have been shared outside of Missouri. In a review of the law on this subject
it was said that "Missouri presents some of the most consistent and well-reasoned

5. 281 Mo. 182, 219 S.W. 643 (1920).
6. 16 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. App. 1929).
7. 29 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1930). In this case the facts were similar to the
principal case. The injury was received by the elevator operator, an employee of
the Association, while taking a passenger to the reading room.
8. 239 Mo. App. 38, 187 S.W.2d 469 (1945). This was a case in which the
Association carried liability insurance. The court did not feel that this alone
should make them liable for their torts.
9. 335 Mo. 436, 196 S.W.2d 615 (1946). This case very clearly adds the
public policy theory to the original trust fund theory in applying the doctrine
in cases of charitable organizations.
10. 85 Fed. Sup. 2 (W.D. Mo. 1949). When the United States District Court
sitting in St. Louis considered the case of Hinman v. Beckman it seemed that
the doctrine was firmly established as a rule of law in Missouri. In their decision, the court said that under Missouri law charitable corporations have complete
and absolute immunity for torts committed within the state of Missouri. The
Dille case, apart, was said to evince a clear deep-rooted public policy.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

33

1956]

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 9
RECENT CASES

cases upon this subject, coupling the more desirable grounds of public policy
with the more common one of the trust fund doctrine in order to reach the desired
result. Its decisions settle the question clearly as to both strangers to the
question clearly as to both strangers to the charity and as to beneficiaries.""
However, the Missouri court in the instant case did not feel it wes changing
Missouri case law.'2 This is not to say that the decision was not a wise one.
3
Massachusetts draws the same distinction as the Missouri court,"
as seemingly
do Pennsylvania'

and Tennessee.'
The only surprising factor of the court's
decision was that they did not cite or distinguish any of these cases to support
their opinion. It would seem this would have been advisable, since the decision
makes a departure. The decision shows a considered understanding of the
problem of the liability of charitable organizations for their torts. It may be
that the need for so broad a protection may have passed.

There is no doubt

that a line at least was needed to be drawn in Missouri. This the court has done.
Perhaps it would have been better if the court had overruled the doctrine altogether and made charities as liable as any corporation. The distinction now
drawn by the court is not altogether illogical." The court seems to have taken a
middle ground and future cases may move toward a more completely modern

view.
RALPH H. SMIH, JR.

11. Appleman, The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions, 22 A.B.A.J.
48 (1936).
12. Blatt v. George H. Nettleton Home for Aged Women, supra note 1, at
page 347. The court seemed to feel that the earlier holdings of the Missouri
cases, speaking particularly of the Ead's case, were not contrary to their own
holding. They went on to remark that if they were in opposition that this
decision overruled them.
13. McKay v. Morgan Memorial Co-op Industries and Stores, Inc., 272 Mass.
121, 172 N.E. 68 (1930). In this case the court allowed the plaintiff to recover
for an injury received in the defendant's store. The court said that the store
was commercial and the fact that the profits were used for the charity did not
give protection.
14. Winnemore v. Philadelphia, 18 Pa. Super. 625 (1902).
15. Gamble v. Vanderbilt University, 188 Tenn. 616, 200 S.W. 510 (1917).
In this, the defendant rented out a building to tenants, and it was in the elevator
of one of these buildings that the plaintiff was injured. The court said the relation was not direct enough and allowed the plaintiff to recover.
16. Loc. cit. 22 A.B.A.J. at p. 48. The writer commented on the fact that
the Missouri position at that time was much more clear and logical than the
distinction drawn by Massachusetts. This is particularly interesting in that the
principal case draws for Missouri that distinction which the writer called illogical.
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